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ABSTRACT 
Nuclear safeguards at inspected facilities aims to deter or detect special nuclear material (SNM) diversion and to do 
so is increasingly relying on process monitoring (PM) to augment nuclear material accounting (NMA). In NMA, 
SNM material balances are computed approximately every 30 days, and modeling and simulation are used to predict 
detector performance, to model SNM flows and inventory, and predict overall NMA performance as measured by 
the measurement error standard deviation of the material balance, MB.  In PM, much more frequent and often short-
cut measurements (less than full SNM accountability) are used, and modeling and simulation are increasingly used 
to predict the effects of SNM diversion on  normal operating data under various scenarios. This  paper reviews 
traditional modeling and simulation roles in NMA, describes new roles in PM, and illustrates using a case study.                                              
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear nonproliferation efforts consist of many facets, including nuclear safeguards, which involve monitoring for 
undeclared nuclear facilities, and monitoring for facility misuse (diversion of special nuclear material, SNM) at 
inspected facilities. This paper considers inspected facilities where measurements of SNM flows and inventories are 
periodically used in nuclear material accounting (NMA) to compute material balances (MB).  The paper focus is 
large bulk-handling (primarily aqueous) facilities where MBs are computed approximately every 10 to 30 days. 
 
Modeling and simulation (M/S) have traditionally been used to predict detector performance, to model SNM flows 
and inventory, and predict overall NMA performance as measured by the measurement error standard deviation of 
the material balance, MB.  Nuclear safeguards is increasingly relying on process monitoring (PM) to augment 
traditional NMA. In PM, much more frequent and often short-cut measurements (less than full SNM accountability 
measurements, see Section 2.3) are used, and M/S are increasingly used to predict the effects of SNM diversion 
under various scenarios on normal operating data. This paper reviews traditional M/S roles in NMA, describes new 
M/S roles in PM, gives four brief examples, then illustrates using a case study. 
 
The following sections include additional background, description of M/S for NMA, M/S for PM, four examples, a 
case study, and summary. 
 
 
2.    BACKGROUND 
This section provides additional background on NMA, containment and surveillance (C/S), and PM. 
 
2.1    NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTIG (NMA) 
NMA involves measuring facility inputs, outputs, and inventory to compute an MB, defined as 
in begin out end MB = T +I -T -I , where T is a transfer and I is an inventory. The main quantitative assessment of 
safeguards effectiveness is the measurement error standard deviation of the MB,MB.  
 M/S are used to propagate measurement errors [1] to estimate MB . Because many measurements are combined to 
estimate the terms Tin,  Ibegin,  Tout , and Iend  in the MB, the central limit theorem and years of experiences implies 
that MBs will be approximately normally distributed with mean equal to the true SNM loss L and standard deviation 
MB, which is expressed as MB ~ N(L,MB ) [2]. The magnitude of MB determines what SNM loss L could would 
lead to an alarm with high probability. For example, with a false alarm probability of = 0.05, if MB ~ N(L,MB )  
then the detection probability (DP), 1-  equals 0.95 for L = 3.3 MB  (and 1 –  > 0.95  if L > 3.3 MB, where  is 
the fail-to-detect, or false negative probability) assuming the facility tests for SNM loss only, not for SNM gain.  IJRRAS 8 (3) ● September 2011  Burr & al. ● Nuclear Material Accounting and Process Monitoring 
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The factor 3.3 arises from symmetry of the Gaussian, requiring  =  = 0.05, and the fact that 1.65 is the 0.95 
quantile of the standard Gaussian. 
For facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, one goal is for 1- to be at least 0.95 if 
L  1  SQ  (significant  quantity,  which  is  8  kg  for  Pu),  which  is  accomplished  if  and  only  if  MB  c SQ/3.3.  If         
MB  > SQ/3.3, then either measurement errors should be reduced to achieve MB  SQ/3.3 (if feasible), or enhanced 
material containment and surveillance (C/S) is required; however, the increased C/S effort level is challenging to 
negotiate  and  the  C/S  effectiveness  (which  can  include  cameras  and  remote  radiation  detection)  is  difficult  to 
quantify.   
Large throughput bulk-handling facilities often try to keep MB  small as a percent of throughput (perhaps MB < 1% 
of throughput) but cannot achieve MB   SQ/3.3. For example, with a measurement error standard deviation of   
MB = 0.3% of throughput, and the IAEA’s DP goals ( =  = 0.05) for an 8,000 kg annual throughput, the diversion 
would have to be 3.3 x 24 kg = 92 kg or larger [3].  This is much larger than one SQ.  One reasonable approach is to 
evaluate the cost of reducing MB and statistical evaluation using M/S is a key tool to estimate MB as a function of 
measurement type(s) and translate the result to a relation between MB and cost. One would then choose the cost 
where the relationship flattens (diminishing returns) and accept the resulting MB. It is generally agreed that the 
resulting MB will be too large in large facilities to meet the IAEA goal for slow (“protracted”) diversion occurring 
over one year for example, but there is reasonable hope that the goal can be met over perhaps 10 days or less. 
 
2.2    CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE (C/S) 
Facilities that cannot meet the IAEA DP goal are required to have negotiated levels of additional C/S measures, such 
as cameras and tamper indicating devices beyond the usual requirements. Smart cameras with context aware image 
processing  can  archive  scenes  involving  declared  transactions,  watch  for  undeclared  transactions,  and  alert  an 
inspector  to  sections  in  the  archive  that  require  human  review.  Image  processing  for  safeguards  applications 
continues to be developed [4]. 
 
2.3    PROCESS MONITORING (PM) 
The scope of quantitative nuclear safeguards is broadening from NMA to also include PM, which has both C/S and 
NMA features. PM is a broad term that can include for example monitoring by radiation detectors and monitoring 
solutions in vessels using pressure-sensing dip tubes, flow meters, or other in-line technologies. Although PM has 
been used as a component of safeguards, as with C/S, there have been very few attempts to quantify its benefits.    
PM goals include support to NMA, but also PM has a “front-line” role to detect changes that could indicate facility 
misuse and to provide continuity of knowledge to support that the facility is operating as declared. The basic concept 
is that facility misuse will generate observables that PM can detect.  For example, altered material flow rates could 
imply an attempt to misdirect SNM. Because flow rates are typically monitored for process control, allowing IAEA 
access to operator flow rate data can provide a quantifiable surveillance benefit. NMA is analogous to a bank 
periodically confirming that the anticipated cash balance (rounded for example to the nearest dollar so measurement 
errors are involved) is in the vault. PM can assist NMA in that role, and PM in conjunction with M/S can also 
provide a surveillance component that is analogous to having cameras in the bank’s vault in a way that has a 
quantifiable benefit. 
Radiation detectors fall under C/S and/or under PM, and can monitor either declared SNM transactions (an item was 
shipped from A to B so the detector should confirm this using detected radiation), can monitor for undeclared 
transactions (such as portal monitors do), and can in some cases provide rough estimates of holdup (Section 6.4). 
Solution monitoring (SM) is a type of PM in which typically masses (M) and volumes (V) are inferred from frequent 
in-process measurements. Transfers between tanks (which are regarded as sub material balance areas (MBAs) ) can 
be identified in these data, segments of which can then be compared to generate transfer differences. We will refer to 
these transfer differences as shipper-receiver differences (SRDs) but caution that these are SRDs between tanks, not 
between full MBAs. A safeguards concern might then be raised if either these SRDs or deviations in M or V data 
during  “wait”  modes  become  significant.    Average  M  and  V  SRDs  should  be  zero  (perhaps  following  a  bias 
adjustment) to within a historical limit that is a multiple of the standard deviation of the M or V SRD, as should 
deviations during “wait” modes. Statistical test options can be compared on the basis of their estimated probabilities 
to detect various material loss scenarios.  
In SM, unless there is in-line Pu concentration measurement, then empirical relations linking Pu concentration to in-
tank density (D) and temperature (T) for a given nitric acid concentration can be used to indirectly estimate Pu 
concentration. Together with a volume V estimate using a calibrated relation between measured solution level L and 
V, an estimate of Pu mass is available. This is an pseudo-measurement because it does not directly measure the Pu. 
However, it can be adequate for what is known as near-real-time accounting (NRTA). NRTA is almost the same as IJRRAS 8 (3) ● September 2011  Burr & al. ● Nuclear Material Accounting and Process Monitoring 
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NMA but uses much more frequent and often rough estimates of Pu holdup and pseudo-measurements of Pu in 
inventory. Technically, unless Pu is actually measured directly, one cannot rule out the possibility that some type of 
operator falsification is being used to mask misdirection of Pu. In current safeguards lingo, NMA refers to less 
frequent, but full SNM accountability measurements to compute an MB. NRTA refers to very frequent MB closure, 
usually with short-cut pseudo measurements of some of the SNM in the MB calculation. PM supports both NMA 
and NRTA, and in some cases could be essentially a form of NRTA with short-cut measurements as just described 
for Pu [5,6]. A second short-cut pseudo-measurement example involving neutrons produced by Cm is given in 
Section 6.3. 
Generally, some pseudo measurements might be permitted but it becomes obvious that subjective decisions 
regarding effectiveness arise. For example, in one NMA/NRTA scheme, true balance closures are not done as often 
as claimed because of the infrequency of actual Pu concentration measurements. True balance closures are less often 
than weekly, but pseudo-balance closures using empirical relations to estimate Pu concentration are very frequent, 
approximately daily. 
 
3.    QUANTIFYING SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS 
At least two obstacles have historically prevented developing an overall safeguards evaluation methodology. First, 
there is general agreement that C/S measures add value, but there is no consensus regarding how to take quantitative 
credit  (for  example,  through  improved  loss  DPs)  for  C/S  in  the  same  manner  that  improved  accountancy 
measurements are given credit (through reduction in MB). Second, there is no consensus regarding the utility of 
enumerating and characterizing the most likely diversion routes and scenarios. Therefore, some assume that because 
no system can detect all types of diversion [7], there will be arbitrary decisions made regarding what diversion 
scenarios the system should detect and therefore what C/S measures will be used. In effect, it is assumed by some 
that the system design should be decided by arbitrary but reasonable decisions made by the safeguards experts 
responsible for a given facility.  
Alternatively, and in the opinion of the authors, DPs using NMA, PM (and perhaps C/S) in a combined manner, it is 
possible  via  M/S  to  estimate  system  DPs  for  a  few  key  specified  diversion  scenarios.  In  addition,  unspecified 
scenarios will cause measurable effects on normal plant data, so outlier detection schemes can be devised to detect 
atypical data associated  with unspecified diversion  scenarios,  without specifying a particular diversion. Current 
efforts using M/S are therefore underway to quantify the benefits of NMA and PM (but not C/S to our knowledge) 
in terms of system loss DPs. 
Designing an effective safeguards system that is “good enough” without being too costly is a practical goal with 
significant challenges. A similar goal is to be able to compare and rank candidate safeguards approaches/systems so 
that  the  cost/benefit  of  purported  improvements  can  be  evaluated.  These  two  goals  are  driving  safeguards 
professionals to consider how M/S can be used to quantify the benefit of NMA, C/S, and PM, which are the three 
key data-driven safeguards systems. 
 
4.    MODELING AND SIMULATION (M/S) FEATURES 
M/S requirements are strongly problem dependent, so to focus this paper, we consider only NMA and PM. 
 
4.1 PROBLEM DOMAIN 
In simulating material flows for NMA or PM, implementations can be batch, continuous, or a hybrid.  Real facilities 
usually are a blend of batch and continuous mode operations. 
 
4.2  APPLICATION 
It is often appropriate to ask “why is M/S needed?”  Possible reasons that M/S are needed in the context of NMA 
and PM include: 
1) To predict what will actually happen when a plant is built 
2) To study misuse scenarios that are not likely to arise in a real plant   
3) To compare safeguards options 
4) To better understand how plants function (for control systems design and PM) 
5) To support NMA by estimating SNM throughput and inventory, including holdup 
6) To provide a model-based summary of the real data 
 
4.3  REQUIRED LEVEL OF M/S DETAIL 
The required level of M/S detail comes from answering the “why is a simulation needed” question.   Performance 
and/or function prediction ((1) and (4) in Section 4.2) need a model that shows what is actually going to happen.  
The other applications in Section 4.2 only require levels of detail that are appropriate to the task, but then a very IJRRAS 8 (3) ● September 2011  Burr & al. ● Nuclear Material Accounting and Process Monitoring 
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clear idea is needed concerning what the task is.  The simulation model must be valid for the task. Mostly validation 
comes through knowledge of real plant operation, although it can also partly come through comparison with other 
simulations. 
Essentially, the required level of detail will determine the required model fidelity and accuracy. Formal validation 
and verification (V&V) methods for computer models [8] have rarely been applied to models used in NMA and PM 
for safeguards. Some V & V methods are considered, however, in codes such as MCNP (MCNP5) [9] which is 
heavily used for detector design for NMA. MCNP could also be used in PM to predict observables from some 
misuse scenarios. 
 A 2007 survey grouped M/S codes into categories including process simulation and modeling, statistical analysis, 
detector modeling, NMA, physical protection, risk assessment, and training [10]. Although intended  uses  were 
briefly  mentioned  for  each  code,  there  was  relatively  little  information  provided  regarding  the  actual  uses. 
Therefore, the code use descriptions in [10] will need to be expanded in order to gauge the corresponding required 
model fidelity. Model fidelity refers to the level of physical detail in the code. Model authenticity refers to a code’s 
ability to mimic reality. Model validity refers to a model’s fitness for purpose. Model accuracy then quantifies that 
fitness. Process design codes are often not that authentic for safeguards purposes; they often falsely assume that 
installed control systems will compensate for process variations. Similarly, operator training simulators might lack 
both fidelity and authenticity, if their main purpose is to enable operators to practice procedures. 
 
4.4   EASE OF DEVELOPMENT 
Ease of development depends on both the task and the model. For example, is the task intended simply to generate 
numbers or are graphs needed? If graphs are needed, should they be interactive with the user?  Should an equation 
solver be used that handles batch-wise, continuous-wise, or hybrid unit operations?  Are multiple runs needed for 
example to optimize something?   Are the MB equations or other equations amenable to matrix operations?    
  
4.5   EXECUTION TIME 
Although NMA simulations for safeguards studies typically cover 10-30 days of activities, they produce output 
every  few  seconds,  thus  generating  large  data  sets.   If  multiple  simulations  are  needed  then  this  fine-step 
requirement might need to be carefully considered.  
      
4.6   PORTABILITY AND OPEN SOURCE VERSUS COMMERCIAL TOOLS 
Software portability refers to the ease of porting code developed under one operating systems, such as Microsoft 
Windows to another operating system such as Linux or Mac. Open source code is freely distributed. Commercial 
tools such as Matlab or Extend require developers and possibly users to purchase a license. 
Matlab stands for Matrix Laboratory [11].  It is a primarily a researcher’s tool, although real-time applications are 
possible.  It is ideal for manipulating matrices such as occur in mixer-settler/pulsed columns in typical reprocessing 
facilities.  Continuous simulations can be constructed in Matlab directly.  It has many toolboxes so for instance the 
simulation  can  be  linked  with  an  optimizer.   One  study  executed  an  optimization  routine  that called a  small 
Matlab continuous simulation about 80 times to locate a diversion [12].  An existing Python hybrid-simulation could 
also have been used, but that Python simulation was not constructed with optimization in mind. In fact, the “batch-
part” of the Matlab simulation is achieved by taking Python outputs as its boundary conditions; that is, the batch 
operations appear continuous. 
Simulink is a block-diagram-based Matlab toolbox intended primarily for relatively small, continuous problems.  
The block diagramming can get complicated quickly. For example, the top-level of a Simulink simulation of an 
evaporator tank has several layers of levels beneath it.  Simulink ouputs to the Matlab workspace, so that the output 
can be post-processed easily for example by principal components analysis.   Matlab routines can be incorporated 
into  Simulink  blocks  [1],  which  has  difficulties  with  batch  operations.  Matlab/Simulink  costs  are  modest,  at 
approximately $1500 per year per license. 
Extend is commercial software for batch processing and is easy to get started but somewhat limited in capability 
[13].   It is not suited for example to GUAM (glovebox unattended remote monitoring, see Section 6.4) analyses for 
mixed-oxide power facilities, because GUAM will output continuously. Its cost is similar to the Matlab cost. 
Python  is  a  compromise  because  it  is  very  flexible  (incorporates  some  programming  concepts  from  the  LISP 
language), free, and not as difficult to learn as other object-oriented languages. It has a large number of free libraries 
including Matlab-style plotting, handlers for large data tables, CSV file handlers, timestamp converters, numerical 
arrays, etc., and GUI development tools. SimPy [14] is available as an add-on library of simulation tools to link 
model components according to resource availability. For example, a glovebox that requires input material from an 
upstream glovebox must enter an idle mode until material is available. Therefore, Python is an excellent choice, 
particularly if it is important for researchers to all contribute and effectively work together. A current example is the IJRRAS 8 (3) ● September 2011  Burr & al. ● Nuclear Material Accounting and Process Monitoring 
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Glasgow University Reprocessing Plant Simulation Program in Python (GU-RPSP) [12]. GU-RPSP simulates an 
aqueous reprocessing facility, and includes tank operations plus has a chemical model of the separations area that is 
based on the SEPHIS model developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory [15].    
 Considering simulation in its own right rather than as a tool for a job is quite a major task.  Our focus is simulation 
as a tool for a specific NMA or PM task. 
 
5.   M/S FOR NMA/NRTA 
M/S are more important to NRTA than to conventional NMA, partly because in the latter, much of the SNM is 
moved to where it can be measured relatively accurately. This luxury is not available to the more timely NRTA. 
Here  we  will  not  distinguish  between  NRTA  and  NMA,  but  recall  that  NMA  refers  to  full  SNM  accounting 
measurements while NRTA refers to much more frequent but partial SNM measurements.  
It is generally agreed that NMA is an essential component of safeguards, but complications include: (1) a lack of 
transparency regarding where SNM actually is in the plant (holdup material in locations that are inaccessible for 
measurement such as ducts, pumps, pipes, separations areas such as pulsed columns, etc.; (2) sampling issues such 
as chemical composition data only being available from samples taken infrequently at a relatively small number of 
locations; (3) poorly estimated measurement error variances; (4) a limited understanding of systematic measurement 
errors; for example, results on physical standards is not representative of results on facility  material for some flow 
streams, especially for waste streams, and (5) lack of timely measurement results.  
Often, short-cut assay methods such as a weight and assumed SNM purity factor do not directly measure the SNM 
of interest but are used for some of the measurements. PM overlaps with NMA if PM is used to estimate holdup 
[16]. Regarding holdup, if there were no measurement error in the transfers and inventory, then the expected value 
of the MB would equal the change in holdup plus the true loss L. The presence of measurement error complicates 
MB evaluation, and the presence of nonnegligible holdup together with measurement error further complicates MB 
evaluation. Nevertheless, provided MB is well estimated, which is often an engineering challenge constrained by 
limited time and budget, and which often invokes M/S to estimate holdup and model measurement processes, it is 
understood as described in Section 2.1 what MB implies about loss detection capability.  
Simulation  for  NMA  typically  involves  modeling  the  flow  and  inventory  of  bulk  SNM,  resulting  in  a  “data 
generator” that records the transfers and inventory in a manner that mimics real facility data [1, 12,14]. More detail 
is required if holdup is  modeled such as done  for powder holdup in gloveboxes [14,16]. One goal for holdup 
modeling is to anticipate the measurement error associated with holdup measurements. Another goal is to provide a 
model-based estimate of holdup that could enhance other estimates or measurements of holdup. For example, [17] 
used FACSIM, which includes a detailed simulation of pulsed columns implemented in C++ to estimate facility 
holdup in the main holdup locations at a large aqueous reprocessing facility. 
Simulation for NMA also models the measurement error process, typically in the same manner that is used in 
propagation  of  variance  (POV)  for  estimating  MB.  For  example,  a  common  measurement  error  model  is       
M = T (1 + Sitem + Sinst + R ), where M is the measured mass, T is the true mass, Sitem is the item-specific systematic 
error (bias), Sinst is the measurement instrument specific systematic error (bias), and R is the random error. All errors 
are random at some stage, which we denote Sinst ~ N(0,Sinst), for example, and N(,) is the normal distribution with 
mean    and  standard  deviation    [2].  In  calculating  the  variance  of  a  sum  of  measurements  (such  as    
mass(Uranium) =  (Volume  Concentration)), the most common model assumes measurements on two items have 
nonzero covariance if and only if they are made by the same instrument during the same instrument calibration 
period, so Sinst is the same for the two measurements. The variance of a sum of two measured items with Sitem + R 
redefined  to  be  Reffective  can  then  be  written  as 
12
2
1 inst1 1 2 inst2 2 var( (1 ) (1 )) MM T S R T S R         .    Because     
Sinst1 = Sinst2 during the same calibration period, it follows that 
12
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 Reff ( ) ( ) M M Sinst T T T T         .  
M/S are useful for evaluating measurement options and sampling plans. For example, highly accurate destructive 
chemical assay (DA) is often applied relatively infrequently on a sampling basis [14,16] and mixing rules or less 
accurate nondestructive assay (NDA) complement DA. M/S can help choose a good allocation of the measurement 
budget to DA plus sampling and mixing rules and to NDA. Reference [1] illustrates using MatLab how M/S helps 
allocate measurement budgets to reduce MB. 
It  is  then  straightforward  to  derive  a  useful  formula  for  a  given  strata  with  SNM  total  T  in  N  items,                          

2
T = T
2 (
2
R/N + 
2
S), which is a common approximate result that illustrates the main difference in how random 
and systematic errors propagate involving division by the number of measurements N.  
Probably the most commonly used sequential statistical test to monitor for SNM loss in MB sequences is Page’s 
cumulative sum (cusum). For MB sequences, the MB concept is slightly generalized to a matrix MB measurement 
variances and covariances [18,19]. Simulation is typically required to estimate the DP of Page’s test. IJRRAS 8 (3) ● September 2011  Burr & al. ● Nuclear Material Accounting and Process Monitoring 
 
   
275 
 
In summary, M/S for NMA studies require: 
     - models of  material flows and inventories, including material holdup 
     - models of  the measurement error process 
      -an implementation of the sequential statistical testing procedure 
NMA is intended to detect but not necessarily deter diversion because balance closures are relatively infrequent, at 
least compared to NRTA. In addition, large throughput facilities have large MB, so DPs can fail to meet IAEA 
detection goals. One effective complement to NMA is PM, as discussed next. 
 
6.   M/S FOR PM 
Simulation for PM is more challenging and less developed than simulation for NMA. The increased challenge arises 
because PM simulations typically must track more components and be closer to the actual chemistry and physics of 
the real facility. 
We consider four brief examples in Section 6, followed by a more detailed case study in Section 7.  
 
6.1   MULTI-ISOTOPE PROCESS MONITOR (MIPM) 
 A monitor to detect isotopic composition shifts is being developed (MIPM, multi-isotope process monitor) that 
could detect certain types of facility misuse [20] on the basis of isotopic shifts. 
 
Three computer codes are currently used in MIP: (1) ORIGEN-ARP to estimate isotopic composition in spent fuel 
[21]; (2) an interface called AMUSE to a commercial chemical engineering code (ASPEN [22]) to estimate the 
distribution of elements in organic and aqueous phases after the first separation stage (this estimation requires an 
estimate from code (1), and (3) Synth [23] or MCNP [10] to model the detected spectra.    
MIP is intended to use measured spectra to detect changes, for example, in acid strength that might be associated 
with facility misuse to misdirect SNM into what should be a low-level waste stream. At least two key M/S concepts 
emerge in MIPM or MIPM-like studies. First, there is likely to be a systematic mismatch (“model bias”) between the 
model and the experimental data due to unmodeled effects [8].  For MIPM, unmodeled effects will include aspects 
of the detector response function, and isotopes that are omitted from the model.  Second, the impact of natural 
process variation is not yet being considered in the MIP context, but should be relatively straightforward to evaluate 
by varying inputs to the computer codes.  
 
6.2    COLD-STREAM CHEMICAL COMPONENTS CHANGE  
The AMUSE code indices that cold-stream chemistry such as acid concentration and flow rate might be important to 
monitor  because  operator  changes  in  the  cold-stream  chemical  compositions  could  misdirect  Pu  [24].  One 
monitoring scheme can be thought of as providing a “book value” for SNM in specified streams that is based on the 
AMUSE model of the unit operation(s). Such a book value could have smaller uncertainty than the uncertainty 
based on comparing all input and output measurements of SNM. Reference [25] describes the potential impact of 
AMUSE uncertainty and process variation in corresponding monitoring schemes. 
 
6.3   CURIUM MONITORING 
A  key  safeguards  measure  in  the  head  end  of  an  aqueous  reprocessing  facility  is  based  on  indirect  indication 
regarding the amount of Pu in the waste generated in the leached hulls following chopping and dissolution of the 
spent fuel assemblies. The indirect indication is obtained by detecting neutrons emitted primarily by Cm [3]. By 
assumption and/or continuing design verification, the head end provides no capability to separate the Cm from the 
Pu. Therefore, if neutron detectors detect no change in the Cm content, it is assumed that there is no change in the 
Pu content, and therefore, no diversion. This type of PM is semi-quantitative in that it can detect change in the 
neutron  counts  but  it  is  difficult  to  model  or  estimate  what  neutron  count  rate  corresponds  to  various  misuse 
scenarios. 
 
6.4   GLOVEBOX UNATTENDED ASSAY SYSTEM (GUAM) 
 In  mixed-oxide  fuel  fabrication,  the  amount  of  plutonium  (Pu)  holdup  in  gloveboxes  can  be  significant  and 
therefore must be monitored. Reference [16] describes the GUAM (glovebox unattended assay system) system for 
measuring Pu holdup in gloveboxes in real time regardless of the status of the plant operations (static or dynamic). 
One challenge is that geometric variation in the Pu holdup can impact the measurement error, so M/S efforts using 
MCNP (MCNP5) are used to minimize measurement errors associated with geometric variations. 
NMA  that  requires  GUAM  to  estimate  holdup  or  holdup  change  needs  to  model  the  random  and  systematic 
components of measurement errors (see Section 5). Current estimates of these components are based on MCNP IJRRAS 8 (3) ● September 2011  Burr & al. ● Nuclear Material Accounting and Process Monitoring 
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modeling efforts, which will need to be benchmarked using holdup measurement studies. SM can contribute here by 
providing a “by-difference” estimate of holdup. 
 
7.    SOLUTION MONITORING (SM) AND EVALUATION SYTEMS (SMES) CASE STUDY 
SMESs are described in [26]. SM can support NMA, for example, by helping to estimate V and M measurement 
error models, possibly by enabling V measurement bias adjustments, and by estimating SNM holdup. The IAEA’s 
SMES, TaMES [27] (tank monitoring evaluation system) collates sample data with inferred plant status to generate 
tank inventory estimates. Its extension to process units would require model-based estimation of inventory [12]. 
Certain SMESs have more of a PM role than a support to NMA role. This is because their main focus is qualitative 
assurance that tank events such as transfers and sampling are in qualitative agreement with operator declarations. 
Thus, SMESs provide continuity of knowledge of tank activities. 
SMESs currently installed in commercially operated plants were either implemented during commissioning, or after 
plant commissioning. They were configured, tested, and evolved using real measurement data. Therefore, SMESs 
are tuned to real operational activities and have had very limited exposure to events such as undeclared removals. 
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that they would have benefitted from testing with simulated data prior to 
software acceptance. There is also anecdotal evidence that inspectors would have benefitted from training on an 
SMES, driven by simulated data. By using a simple whole plant simulation, [12] demonstrates that current SMESs 
have limited ability, partly because they lack internal simulation capabilities.  
A  few  SMESs  have  been  described  that  use  model-based  reasoning  [26],  particularly  to  flag  and  resolve 
anomalies. They reason using conservation laws because these laws closely relate to accountancy. A simulation that 
corresponds to the real SM system is used, which is based on the application of these laws. The simulation can be 
invoked  by  a  trigger  or  at  regular  intervals.  Once  invoked,  simulation  boundary  conditions  (particularly  mass 
transport  histories)  are estimated  from  measurement  data. The  simulation  is  then executed and its  results are 
compared with measurement data to generate one or more errors vectors that are thought of as “symptoms” to be 
diagnosed. Reasoning processes then examine these errors to hypothesis, then order, possible causes. A particular 
hypothesis might be evaluated by re-executing the simulation and using an inverse modelling technique that chooses 
M/S parameters that best fit the observed data.  
There are many types of data potentially available for SM for safeguards applications. Section 2.3 described the 
commonly-available in-tank (L, D, T, V, M) measurements. Reference [28] describes a relatively data-rich option 
that includes measured flows and constituent concentrations in all pipes entering and exiting connected tanks. True 
material flows and constituent masses for each of three tanks are simulated using first-order approximation to the 
associated  differential  equations  for  mass  balances.  Associated  measured  flows  are  also  simulated  using  basic 
measurement error modeling.   Analysis of the resulting time series of associated vector-valued prediction errors 
indicates important differences in the measurement error structures compared to those in the more common type of 
simulated SM data that does not assume flow rate measurements are available to help predict tank contents. 
The DP results in [29] are optimistic because they were developed using simulated SM data that is thought to be 
“too clean” in that real data effects related to process variation and measurement effects are not well modeled. This 
implies that loss DP results estimated from simulated data are currently too optimistic. Multivariate statistical PM 
options (e.g., Crosier’s multivariate cusum) have more recently been applied to residuals produced from simulated 
SM data that had no process variation, only random and systematic measurement errors [19].   
Figure 1 is a schematic of some of the buffer, feed, and receipt tanks and processing  
equipment in an aqueous reprocessing facility. Figure 2 illustrates “vanilla” simulated data from the first cycle of 
some of the tanks and more realistic simulated data in the second cycle of the same selected tanks. The vanilla data 
was generated using the Glasgow University Reprocessing Plant Simulation Package (GURPSP) [12] in Python. 
The estimated start and stop times of the input accountability tank’s first receipt and first shipment are marked [ref]. 
Because the start and stop times are estimated, errors in event marking contribute to the V and M SRD error. 
Figure 3 illustrates V residuals from wait and SRD modes from selected tanks. Such residuals are anticipated to be 
input to loss detection monitoring schemes. The magnitudes of these residuals will depend strongly on the process 
variation and measurement error models. Crosier’s cusum can still be applied to these more realistic residuals, but 
the behavior of Crosier’s cusum still needs to be evaluated in the no-loss and positive-loss cases. The tank 4 book 
value is based on a rudimentary model of the first separation cycle, with “tank 4” holding the highly active waste 
(HAW). 
Figure 4 (a) is simulated residuals from 1000 V SRD measurements. Figure 4 (b) is a density estimate of the same 
1000 V SRDs. The shipment measurements were generated using: 
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where R is pure random error, assumed to have a normal distribution with relative standard deviation R = 0.02, and 
S is systematic error, assumed to have a normal distribution with relative standard deviationS = 0.005. These 
relative standard deviations are all relative to the amount shipped, or for receipts, relative to the amount of received 
material. The SRD is then  Shipment Receipt SRD , and simulated receipts were also generated using Eq. 
(1) with the same values R = 0.02 and S = 0.005 
There are two process variation terms in Eq. (1). The term PV1 is also assumed to be normal with relative standard 
deviation PV1 = 0.02. The term PV2 is a mixture [30,31] with equal (1/3) probability from three random signed 
values whose magnitudes are normal with relative standard deviation PV1 = 0.01. The signed values represent give-
and-take quantities due to the solution transfer mechanism. A plus sign indicates a “give” to the pipes/pump and a 
minus  sign  indicates  a  “take”  from  the  pipes/pump.  The  sign  was  randomly  generated  for  each  event,  with  a 
probability 0.5 for plus and 0.5 for minus to model random pattern in the sequence of “giving” and “taking” from 
the pipes/pump. This PV2 is therefore a mixture of three mean values, with each value representing an average M or 
V amount given to or taken from the pipes/pump during each tank-to-tank transfer. If one averaged over many SRDs 
then  the  central  limit  effect  implies  that  the  average  SRD  should  be  approximately  Gaussian  in  distribution. 
However,  individual  SRDs  will  exhibit  the  mixture  behavior  and  because  the  SM  system  must  also  evaluated 
individual SRDs, the mixture model is needed.  
Figure 4 (c) is the same as Figure 4 (a) but is for a second realization of the PV2 mixture. Figure 4 (d) is the density 
estimate of the 1000 V SRDs in Figure 4 (c). The mixture effect is very clearly visible in (b), and also visible in (d).  
In Figures 4 (a) and (c), the two horizontal lines are at  ˆ 2 SRD    where  ˆSRD  is the estimated standard deviation of 
the V SRD using the 1000 V SRDs from (a) and from (c), respectively. For (a),  ˆSRD  is approximately 5% relative to 
the true shipped V and for (b), is  ˆSRD   is approximately 7% relative. Averaged over all realizations of the PV2 term, 
ˆSRD  is approximately 5% relative to the true shipped V. Without using simulation, an incorrect calculation of the 
relative standard deviation (RSD) of the V SRDs assumes the four error terms in Eq. (1) capture all the V SRD 
measurement error. However, imperfect event marking which arises in real data and in our analysis of simulated 
data  also  contributes  to  the  V  SRD  measurement  error  as  can  be  seen  by  comparing  the  incorrect  calculation 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
12 .02 +.005 +.02  +.01   0.03 R S PV PV RSD             to  the  observed  0.05  (averaged  over 
10,000 realizations of the PV2 term). This illustrates the that M/S can help assess the impact of marking error [32]. 
 
 In Figures 4 (a) and (b), assuming a single-component Gaussian leads to overestimation of tail probability. For 
example, approximately 4% (based on 100,000 rather than 1,000 simulations) of the V SRDs exceed  ˆ 2 SRD   , and 
the 4% is repeatable across sets of 100,000 simulations to within  0.001  . In the approximating single-component 
Gaussian  approximately  5%  will  exceed  ˆ 2 SRD   . More  extreme  tail  probabilities  are  also  overestimated  by  a 
single-component Gaussian, and by a larger relative amount. 
  
In plots 4 (c) and (d), assuming a single -component Gaussian leads to an underestimation of tail probability. For 
example, approximately 9% of the V SRDs exceed  ˆ 2 SRD   while in the approximating single-component Gaussian 
approximately 5% will exceed  ˆ 2 SRD   . The approximating single-component Gaussian overestimates variance to 
compensate for ignoring the presence of multiple means. Whether this overestimation of variance leads to over or 
under estimation of tail area probabilities depends on the realization of the mixture distribution. This implies that V 
SRDs from each facility will have to be evaluated from each tank pair in order to set alarm thresholds. Our M/S 
software uses Eq. (1) with R , S, PV1, and PV2 chosen so that the  ˆSRD  from  simulated V SRDs is in close 
agreement with  ˆSRD  from real data. 
Figure 5 illustrates that the relation between V and L impacts the correlation between measured M and V. Tank V is 
almost never a simple function of solution L because these large tanks have atypicial geometry, pipes penetrating the 
tank at varying levels, and possibly accumulation of organic material that impacts dip tube probe conductivity in 
different ways as a function of solution L [33]. Current M/S implementations do not include detailed tank geometry 
so the L, V relation is not modeled from first principles, but instead is chosen on the basis of experience with real 
facility data.  Figure 4 and Equation (1) described process variation and measurement error effects on V. Figure 5 
illustrates how our code (in R) simulated measured M to correspond to measured V.  IJRRAS 8 (3) ● September 2011  Burr & al. ● Nuclear Material Accounting and Process Monitoring 
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At present, there are no methods to combine NMA and SM data. However, it is anticipated that a safeguards systems 
that combines NMA and SM will have higher DP for specified diversion scenarios. M/S is being used in the context 
of combining NMA and SM by: (a) modeling process variation and measurement error effects on M and V SM data 
as described an illustrated in Figures 3-5; (b) modeling the effects of facility misuse (misdirection of SNM), and (c) 
developing simulated training and testing data to evaluate candidate options to combine NMA and SM data. Note 
that tasks (a-c) have components of all six M/S goals in Section 4.2. For example, Eq. (1) has been developed on the 
basis of real tank data (refs) and can be regarded as a model-based summary of real data (goal #6 from Section 4.2). 
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Figure 1. Example aqueous reprocessing facility layout with two input accountability tanks (IAT), one product 
accountability tank (PAT), several buffer tanks, and feed and receipt tanks surrounding the separations cycles. HAW 
is highly active waste; LAW is low active waste. 
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Figure 2. Simulated mass data in arbitrary units every 6 minutes from the indicated tanks. Unmeasured holdup 
represents the change in unmeasured holdup in the first separations cycle. The first tank cycle has zero process 
variation and zero measurement error. The second tank cycle includes process variation and measurement error. In 
(a), the “E” are the estimated start and stop times of the first receipt and first shipment.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Residuals in wait and SRD modes for the indicated tanks. 
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Figure 4. Volume V SRDs from tank1 to tank 2 for two realizations of the process variation 1 (PV1) mixture 
distribution. Plot (a) is the V SRD for each of 1000 shipments . Plot (b) is a density estimate of the same 1000 
SRDs. Plot (c) is the same as plot (a), but for the second realization of the PV1 mixture. Plot (d) is the density 
estimate for plot (c).  
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Figure 5. The relationship between V and L impacts the correlation between M and V, corr(M,V). 
 
8.    CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
We have described some of the model and simulation (M/S) goals for nuclear material accounting (NMA) and 
process  monitoring  (PM),  focusing  on  the  simplest  current  M/S  applications  such  as  those  used  in  solution 
monitoring that rely mostly on bulk mass and constituent mass balances to simulate real material flows.  M/S efforts 
always require assessment of whether current model fidelity is fit for purpose, and the Section 7 example illustrated 
statistical modeling (Eq. (1)) of process variation due to details of how material is moved and measurement error 
effects, neither of which are modeled using first/ physical principles. We do not anticipate requiring a first /physical 
principles model for how material is moved or measured. However, it is necessary to develop a statistical model 
analogous to Eq. (1) for different material shipment methods such as pump/pipe, steam jet, or air lift. Analogously, 
Example 6.1 (MIPM) involving detected gamma spectra relies on first/physical principles to model source and 
transport terms, but for the modeled detector response relies on empirical assessment of fielded detectors rather than 
on first/physical principles modeling of the detectors. 
The  increasing  role  for  PM  requires  M/S  tools  to  characterize  effects  of  facility  misuse  so  that  loss  detection 
probabilities can be estimated for various monitoring options. Others are expanding the M/S goals as the safeguards 
community further develops M/S tools. For example, M/S is being used to predict SNM amounts in waste streams 
(Examples 6.2 and 6.3) using models of the dissolution operation in the head end of an aqueous reprocessing facility 
and using detailed chemical models of the separations process plus on-line monitoring of flow rates and constituent 
concentrations.   
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